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**FINANCE CORPS:
REFORMULATED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HUGH B. TANT III
United States Army

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of Defense by reformulating roles and missions among the three Services. In response, a proposal is presented to create the Joint Resource Management Corps (JRMC). This new paradigm for financial management consists of a six step process and provides a dynamic approach to creating a purple-suited finance operation for the 21st century.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

FINANCE CORPS: REFORMULATED FOR THE 21st CENTURY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Hugh B. Tant, III
United States Army

Colonel Dan Palmer
Project Advisor

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Hugh B. Tant, III, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
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This paper addresses the requirement to have a Theater Finance Command deployed to the theater of operations during the next campaign. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm the financial responsibilities within the theater of operations expanded well beyond the capabilities of the two colonel-commanded finance groups. Finance doctrine clearly called for the deployment of a Theater Finance Command (TFC). The TFC is responsible for the accomplishment of centralized funding, commercial accounting, foreign national pay, and appropriated and nonappropriated fund accounting. The TFC led by a finance general is capable of providing finance policy on the battlefield and serving as the single authority for coordination with key finance leaders in CONUS, such as the Department of Defense Comptroller, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management), the Comptroller of the Army (COA), and Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Additionally, Senator Nunn has called for more action to realize economies and efficiencies within the Department of Defense by reformulating roles and missions among the three Services. In response, a proposal is presented to create the Joint Resource Management Corps (JRMC). This new paradigm for financial management consists of a six step process and provides a dynamic approach to creating a purple-suited finance operation for the 21st century.

Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction....Countless minor incidents--the kind you can never really foresee--combine to lower the general level of performance.... Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.¹

Truly, the wise words of Clausewitz apply today as they did when he wrote them over 160 years ago. In the financial management arena during the Persian Gulf War, "friction" was experienced due to the non-deployment of a Theater Finance Command (TFC). As noted by Colonel Heard, former Finance School Commandant, "One of the most interesting controversies to come out of financial operations in Desert Shield/Desert Storm is the issue of non-deployment of a Theater Finance Command."²

Army doctrine clearly states:

Finance organizations must provide the best possible support to commanders and soldiers in a highly mobile and fluid environment. Finance support in the theater is the responsibility of the TFC commander.³

The lack of a Theater Finance Command in Saudi Arabia deprived warfighters as well as the deployed finance units of the capability to provide the best possible financial support and service. There was a great need for a TFC organization led by a finance general officer who could provide the proper forces and ensure a well coordinated finance operation.

Warfighters cannot afford to not have a TFC in the next war. This paper will address the issues of not deploying a TFC, the problem of not having general officer leadership at the helm of the Finance Corps, and provide recommendations on how to fix these problems and be ready for the next major conflict. The last half of this paper will present a new paradigm for financial

management into the 21st century--the Joint Resource Management Corps.

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM DEPLOYMENT

The Saudi theater of operations rapidly expanded as 18th Airborne Corps, CENTCOM HQS, and units in the echelons above corps category were deployed from CONUS. With these forces were nearly 400 finance soldiers from various units under the operational control of the 18th Corps Finance Group (commanded by a colonel). This number grew to nearly 800 finance soldiers (see Appendix) after 7th Finance Group from Germany and the 338th Finance Support Unit from Puerto Rico deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA). The key unit that was missing was the Theater Finance Command. By not having this important unit present, the finance community was deprived of leadership that could provide financial management policy in country as well as serve as the key link to the DOD Comptroller, Headquarters, Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS-HQ), the Army DCSPER, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management), and FORSCOM.

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm there was a plethora of pay and entitlement changes either being considered or authorized by Congress. Additionally, since there existed no single point for coordination and policy, many requirements and questions from key financial leaders in CONUS significantly contributed to the confusion level. A war zone further complicates this problem because of limited communication capabilities. Conflicting demands far exceeded the capabilities of those several organizations attempting to do the near impossible tasks that

only a Theater Finance Command could do. The Pay Support Evaluation Team (PAYSET) report aptly describes the essence of the problem and states:

With the establishment of DFAS and the increased emphasis on joint operations, the roles and responsibilities of the various organizations involved in finance related policy and operations need to be defined/redefined. Additionally, the flow and media for communications must be addressed to preclude conflicting policy or duplicative policy inquiries. Entitlements policy, procedures, and interpretations go through up to five levels, with multiple organizations at each level, before reaching a Finance and Accounting Office (FAO) or finance unit (FSC) for implementation (see Figure 1). Multiple lines of communication between and within levels, coupled with a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities for organizations involved, created time delays and a gap between the expectations of "customers" (i.e. CENTCOM) and actual implementation by the finance network. Additionally, changes in organizational roles during the operations, both in and outside of theater, further complicated the process. Within theater, Army finance policy was transferred from the 18th FG to ARCENT and then to the 22d SUPCOM. Additionally, CENTCOM and FORSCOM were involved in establishing theater finance policy. At least six organizations were providing policy guidance and information to the theater to include the PDT&TAC, DOD Comptroller, DFAS-HQ, Army DCSPER, DFAS-IN, and FORSCOM. Clear simplified lines of responsibility for the dissemination of policy and implementation guidance need to be developed.⁴




Figure 1

During the period of August-December 1990, the 18th Corps Finance Group assumed the duties of the TFC even though grossly understaffed to perform this role. Many subordinate units had to help bear the cost of this effort in terms of personnel assets which were already spread thin due to the wide dissemination of units throughout the desert. Early on, General Schwarzkopf made the decision "to deploy maximum combat power at the expense of deploying logistics support...."⁵ This decision caused the logistics structure to be built on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, because of the ad hoc approach to providing logistics support within SWA, there was a tremendous demand for the use of host nation capabilities to include an enormous requirement for commercial vendor services. This demanded that the Corps Finance Group Commander develop and disseminate command guidance for interservice and host nation support agreements, military banking requirements including central funding operations for the entire theater, disbursing and accounting operations, blackmarketing, guidance to support units above the corps level, and a host of responsibilities that clearly fall within the scope of a Theater Finance Command.

This time the gods smiled on the Finance Corps because it had two senior officers who performed with uncanny astuteness. Their ability to manage not only the tremendous logistics challenge but also the diverse financial management operation added immeasurably to the successful sustainment of deployed

forces. Colonel Roger Scearce, a finance officer, and the key player on Lieutenant General Pagonis' staff, literally "moved a mountain" of supplies to Saudi Arabia and coordinated a host nation support effort that only a master magician could emulate. Colonel Barry Baer, the Commander of the 18th Corps Finance Group, was the brains behind setting up the most efficient and widely dispersed finance operation in the Persian Gulf War. Together, these two officers built a logistics capability and fiscal operation to support a bare-based theater with the acumen of flexibility and adaptability just short of a miracle. Both the logistics and the financial operations were key to the effective operation of the sustainment system and fortunately both components had finance officers at the helm. On 27 October 1990, LTG Pagonis described the early success of finance like this:

Having been here from the start, I can attest that the rapid build-up just could not have been accomplished without the contributions of the Finance Corps, particularly in supporting procurement operations. Finance placed purchasing power in commander's hands by allowing ordering officers to immediately procure goods and services from the local economy to sustain our forces. This has become especially important, given our very extended supply lines. Finance support is one thing I can confidently say is not broke. Finance units are very small, but take care of large populations, spread over vast distance. Pay support is very important to our soldiers' and their families' morale. However, finance, contracting, and host nation support have been the foundation of our logistical efforts in Saudi Arabia. Finance has been available around the clock and is an integral part of every unit's operations. They serve as true combat

multipliers by enabling the log base to become established as commanders obtain what they need locally.⁶

That was truly a success story for the early build up of one corps in the theater. The demands of the theater, especially with the addition of a second corps and many units in the echelons above corps category, caused finance operations to expand well beyond the capabilities of a corps finance group, or even two corps finance groups. The friction caused by this expansion clearly attests to the absolute need for a Theater Finance Command in the future. The risk to mission accomplishment was greatly increased as the theater grew. Unquestionably, a Theater Finance Command deployed to SWA to coordinate the enormous demand for finance support would have greatly improved the success of the finance mission.

DECISION TO NOT DEPLOY A THEATER FINANCE COMMAND

No question, a great need existed to deploy a Theater Finance Command to Southwest Asia. Finance doctrine in FM 14-7 states:

Finance support in the theater is the responsibility of the TFC commander. It is responsible for the accomplishment of centralized theater support missions such as contingency funding, commercial accounting, foreign national pay, and appropriated and nonappropriated fund accounting.⁷

The TFC has the capability to support both joint and combined commands and is the organization that provides finance technical as well as policy guidance to all finance units in the

theater. The commander reports directly to the Theater Army Commander and is responsible for coordinating all finance support within the theater. Some examples include central funding for all Services; establishing rates of exchange; developing procedures for the issuance and use of military payment certificates; procedures for the disposition of captured currencies; and commercial vendor policies. Furthermore, the TFC provides the technical liaison between the in-country finance units and the out-of-theater directing organizations such as DFAS, ASA-FM, U.S. Treasury, and FORSCOM J-8.⁸

Colonel Heard, the former Finance School Commandant, went personally to the Comptroller of the Army (COA) to seek support for deploying a TFC to SWA. Heard explained the necessity for the TFC. He stressed the need for unity of effort for finance coordination as well as policy and decision-making for the entire theater. The COA "sent a message to LTG Yeosock requesting approval." The reply was "not at this time." The brigadier general commanded TFC did not happen.⁹ The policy making duties of the TFC were passed from the 18th Corps Finance Group to an ad hoc operation managed by the DCSRM of ARCENT.

As the conflict ended, the ARCENT DCSRM, 18th FG and the 7th FG redeployed, leaving finance units under the 22d SUPCOM which has no organic staff.¹⁰

In fact, what remained was a National Guard Finance Support Command of nearly 90 soldiers that had to support a huge redeployment and clean up operation--a mission that should have been managed under the staff overwatch of a TFC.

The decision not to deploy a TFC was a mistake--a lesson learned the hard way. In contrast, the DCSPER met with the Army Chief of Staff and sold the idea to deploy a Personnel Command (PERSCOM) commanded by a brigadier general to SWA. The PERSCOM is the Adjutant General Corps' counterpart to the Finance Corps' TFC. "The PERSCOM was literally custom-made and sent over."¹¹

Why could one be justified and not the other? The DCSPER went to the Army Chief of Staff rather than to the ARCENT Commander and sold the need for the PERSCOM. Sometimes it pays to go to the top! What remains flawed is that regardless of who said yes or no, doctrine clearly calls for a TFC to be deployed. In essence, the strategic decision to forego the deployment of a TFC demonstrates limited commitment to strategic decisions which created the requirement for the TFC doctrine. There should never have been a question--the TFC should have begun a partial deployment when the balloon went up. This way, the TFC would have established itself to easily expand when echelons above corps units and a second corps deployed. Specifically, when the advance party of CENTCOM headquarters deployed, a slice of the TFC should have been included. The problem was that Third Army did not understand finance doctrine and the importance of the TFC capabilities. The dilemma, however, involves more than failure to deploy a TFC. The Finance Corps did not have a TFC in the active component available to deploy. A recommendation to fix this untenable posture follows.

DEPLOYABLE THEATER FINANCE COMMAND FOR THE NEXT WAR

Planning for the next war must include provisions for the deployment of a Theater Finance Command commanded by a brigadier general to enhance finance support for deployed forces.

Presently, there are two active component TFCs commanded by colonels (one in Germany and one in Korea) and one TFC in the reserves. The two active TFCs are intensely involved with peacetime missions and are also prepared for wartime support in their respective geographical areas. The reserve TFC could provide the key structure to support a major conflict in the future. The reserve TFC could be augmented by an active duty Finance Corps general officer and other key active duty personnel during wartime.

As the Army downsizes, the creation of another TFC in the active component will be a hard sell. Indeed, there will be a greater reliance on the reserves in the future. A great opportunity exists to train-up the reserve TFC with the oversight of the active duty finance general. This relationship has the potential to provide the best theater finance operations in the next campaign. The cost would be minimal but the gain would be tremendous. Naturally, closer ties with our fellow reserve forces would be enriched as well. We would finally be creating a "One Army" concept ready to deploy and help win the next war.

The reserve TFC could deploy incrementally and expand to its full size of 19 officers and 67 enlisted soldiers as the theater expands to two corps and/or has EAC units deployed. It will

promote effective coordination/liaison with higher headquarters and serve as the single point for technical coordination with organizations like DFAS, ASA-FM, and FORSCOM. It will free the finance groups from the encumbrance of having to deal with external agencies. Finance policy development, central funding and technical guidance will be some of the key missions of the deployed TFC. If the Army is made the executive agent for financial policy in the theater, there will be more efficiency by having one voice for all finance matters. Furthermore, the TFC structure led by a general officer will provide the capability to better support the deployed force.

The general officer will be the principal coordinator for the strategic financial needs of the warfighting CINC to help sustain the force during major campaigns. The TFC commander will take the lead on policy decisions: banking and currency support; support for the procurement process; control of currency on the battlefield; support of units within the theater; support of DOD civilians; travel entitlements; Leave and Earnings Statements distribution; non-U.S. pay support; accounting support; and dissemination of legislative policy pertaining to pay and entitlements. When the war draws down, there exists a huge mission for clean-up and redeployment. The TFC commander will provide policy guidance to ensure smooth, continuous financial support during this difficult period.

FINANCE GENERAL OFFICER LEADERSHIP

Presently, the Commandant of the Finance School is a colonel who is also Chief of the Finance Corps, President of the Finance Board, and President, Finance Corps Association. The Commandant's role entails the development of doctrine, the finance battlefield system, and proponency, as well as being responsible for functional training--all finance and accounting and resource management courses for the Army.

When the Finance Corps Commandant is upgraded to brigadier general another hat is gained--Theater Finance Commander. When the TFC deploys, the finance general would also deploy, leaving the deputy (envisioned to be a colonel) to serve as the Acting Commandant of the Finance School. This will allow the top finance officer to be in the theater of operations developing finance policy and reporting to the Theater Army Commander. Also, the finance general will serve as the key link for technical financial management liaison with the directive organizations located in CONUS. The finance general will be leading from the front where top leaders should be. The general officer will provide the unity of effort and strength of purpose needed for the future of the Finance Corps.

SELLING THE THEATER FINANCE COMMAND

To convince the top leadership of the Army about the value and need for the TFC on the next battlefield, the present leadership of the Finance Corps must sell this message to the

Army Chief of Staff. This includes upgrading the position of the Commandant of the Finance School to brigadier general, who will be dual-hatted as the TFC Commander. During a wartime deployment, the finance brigadier general will be the commander of the existing Theater Finance Command, the 366th TFC (USAR). Finally, the Third Army/ARCENT Commanding General will follow the direction of the Army Chief of Staff to include the Theater Finance Command within his Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) and campaign plans--no easy task but an achievable one.

Colonel Russ Dowden, the present Commandant of the Finance Corps, is a combat veteran of Viet Nam and commanded the 7th Finance Group during Desert Storm. Colonel Dowden and the Finance Board (consisting of finance colonels) have the expertise to fully develop and sell this idea to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) and the Chief of Staff of the Army. The results will be that the Finance Corps will gain the general officer leadership it deserves. A CONUS-based (USAR) Theater Finance Command will be ready to deploy when the next call to war is sounded. The Army will be better served by the Finance Corps in peace and war by having a finance brigadier general carrying the ball.

CONCLUSION

Indeed, warfighters need and deserve to have a Theater Finance Command led by a finance general officer in future wars. Synchronization of all aspects of finance support on the

battlefield is made possible by a Finance Corps led by an experienced Finance Corps general officer. Brigadier General Virgil A. Richard, the last finance general officer to command the United States Army Finance and Accounting Center, so aptly recalled, "You can't teach what you haven't done and you can't lead where you haven't been."¹² Moreover, the officers and soldiers need the leadership provided by a general officer. This can be achieved by elevating the position of Commandant of the Finance School to brigadier general dual-hatted as the TFC Commander.

Furthermore, current Finance doctrine remains sound. Finance units are combat multipliers to the warfighting CINCs. Money in the theater purchases critically needed logistical items and supports soldiers as well. This is true today as it was in General Washington's army and even Caesar's legions.

The Theater Finance Command is a vital element to coordinate all finance policy, new entitlements legislation, appropriated and nonappropriated accounting, banking and currency operations, and finance support on the battlefield. The leadership of a finance general officer and a TFC trained and ready to deploy must be sold to the Army's top leadership. The finance general's diverse experiences, knowledge, and vision will provide the lubricant for "friction" in the complex finance arena. Only then can the Finance Corps have the leadership it deserves in peace and war. Only then will the warfighting CINCs have the best finance operation available anywhere in the world.

JOINT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CORPS: A NEW PARADIGM

Today is truly an exciting time to be in the military--a time for innovation, creativity, and positive change. There are major changes taking place as the three Services within the Department of Defense "build down." This downsizing of the huge military machine will result in many economies and efficiencies as the roles and missions of the three Services are redefined. Many organizations and functions are being streamlined which will result in consolidations, transfers of responsibility, and the elimination of redundancy.

The remainder of this paper begins with the framework for change which is permeating the entire Department of Defense. The tone for change being set, a new paradigm for establishing joint financial management among the Services is presented as a six step process for change. These important steps are essential to creating the new Joint Resource Management Corps--the sharp point of the arrow that will lead defense financial management into the 21st century.

In the past, the three Services were more independent and had their own agendas on how to best do business. Unfortunately, this created parochialism, jealousy, and severe inter-service rivalry for roles, missions, and resources which often resulted in redundancy, waste, and a huge burden on the American taxpayer. To help correct these many inefficiencies, landmark legislation known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was enacted. The important changes resulting from this

legislation are permeating the entire Department of Defense as the Services become more joint in their conduct of operations.

CALL FOR ACTION

A call for more action, based on the impetus of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, was stressed by Senator Sam Nunn in his floor speech given on 2 July 1992 entitled "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services' Roles and Missions."

Senator Nunn exclaimed the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act when he stated:

We saw the first tangible fruits of the Act in Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in Southwest Asia. For the first time, the services were integrated in a way that combined the unique strengths of the individual services.

Moreover, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney supported the above idea and said:

I am personally persuaded that (Goldwater-Nichols) was the most far reaching piece of legislation affecting the Department since the original National Security Act of 1947.... Clearly, it made a major contribution to our recent military successes.

Senator Nunn articulated in his speech that the process of reform is not complete. There is still a tremendous amount of redundancy costing billions of dollars every year. The senator called for many roles and missions to be changed and stressed

that now is the time--in view of the huge national deficit--to be innovative and creative in our comprehensive drive to reduce the high cost of defense. The challenge is to work smarter and to be proactive in reducing the huge military machine without reducing its capability to support the National Military Strategy.

Recently, the Department of Defense directed (in the form of Defense Management Report Decision No. 910, undated) that the Defense Finance and Accounting Service assume management responsibility for finance and accounting functions of the DOD components. Additionally, it directed that a plan for capitalizing and consolidating applicable functions be made to include the disposition of tactical finance and accounting operations. This was the result of President Bush's desire that the Secretary of Defense perform a "self appraisal" of the Department of Defense. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) has been instituted to standardize finance and accounting policies and systems for all of the Services and to streamline operations. Other examples of consolidation or capitalization also being promoted include the Defense Business Operation Fund (DBOF) which is intended to consolidate all industrial and supply revolving funds. Another example would be the integration of the multitude of business management information systems. All of these DOD management initiatives are major changes in the way business will be done, and the objectives are to save resources--both manpower and money--by eliminating redundant processes. Collectively, the DOD

initiatives are expected to generate millions of dollars in savings over the next few years.

Taxpayers should applaud these tremendous efforts! We finance soldiers and resource managers, too, should applaud these efforts because our implied charter is to be the honest brokers for creating efficiencies and economies wherever possible to help ensure that the maximum value is achieved from every taxpayer dollar. Yes, we are in for some exciting times in the 90's and beyond. Indeed, we can use innovation to the benefit of all, if we enthusiastically promote positive change within the framework of DMRD 910 and Senator Nunn's call for further action. A word of caution is needed here. Take heed of Senator Nunn's suggestion from his above referenced speech regarding the possible consolidation of several branches within the Army:

The Army has three separate branches that do largely administrative work--the Quartermaster, Adjutant General, Finance branches. Could they be combined into a consolidated administrative branch?

No question, Senator Nunn's suggestion seems appropriate on the surface. The problem is this ground has been plowed many times in the past and every time the answer is to keep these three branches separate. Quartermaster and Finance were combined from 1912-1920 and this combination failed miserably. This short lived consolidation caused the Secretary of War and the Congress to fix the problem and to separate the organizations. Separation of these three branches is critical because essential internal

controls to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse would otherwise be impaired. For example, under a consolidated administrative branch concept there would be no separation of authority between those authorizing a contract for logistical support and those making the payment. This situation is like having "the fox in the hen house." In short, the missions of these branches are so technical and specialized that by combining them we lose the required skills to perform all of the missions well. While we seek a multiplier effect by combining these branches, what we actually get is a negative effect because of the wide diversity of skills required. For example, during Desert Storm the principle missions of the Adjutant General Corps were personnel accountability and casualty operations. The skills required differ greatly from the finance mission of commercial vendor services, banking services, financial accounting, paying soldiers, processing travel vouchers, paying for local hires, processing financial documents for enemy prisoners of war, and the list goes on. Clearly, if we combine AG, Finance, and Quartermaster into an Administrative Branch, we will lose specialized skills and will be repeating lessons already learned "the hard way."

Moreover, in line with Senator Nunn's challenge, there are skills which exist that can easily be combined: the skills of finance and accounting and comptroller. In the Army, Finance is a career field and Comptroller is considered a functional area--both separately controlled. The Comptroller functional area

could easily be rolled in with the Finance Branch to realize additional economies and efficiencies as sought by Senator Nunn. This makes good sense. A precedent for this already exists in the Air Force.

SIX STEP PLAN

Indeed, the remainder of this paper will be in response to the initiative of DMRD 910 and Senator Nunn's call for action! A new paradigm for the future of tactical finance units and resource management functions will be presented. In essence, I will demonstrate how the concept of a Joint Resource Management Corps (a consolidation of the tactical finance units and organizations and the resource management/comptroller functions) will enhance the Department of Defense's effort to work smarter and generate efficiencies and economies.

In March 1992 the active Army completed its transition to the Air Force's pay system (Joint Services Software). This was a major step towards consolidation of the military pay function--a giant undertaking towards a "purple suited" pay corps, but again, only a first step. The following six step plan to fully implement a totally joint financial management force is as follows:

STEP ONE: Put comptroller functional area under Finance Branch within the U.S. Army;

STEP TWO: Create Joint Resource Management Corps Steering Committee;

STEP THREE: Designate U.S. Army as executive agent to develop joint training and doctrine for Joint Resource Management Corps;

STEP FOUR: Adopt Joint Service Software for all Services;

STEP FIVE: Consolidate Joint Service Software for all Services at one DFAS Center;

STEP SIX: Create Joint Resource Management Corps.

The first step consolidates the comptroller functional area under the managerial responsibility of the Finance Branch. This action will allow the Army to centralize and streamline the professional development and distribution of all officers associated with financial management. This consolidation will enhance the utilization of these officers with challenging assignments to fit the needs of the Army. This important first step will set the stage for the subsequent steps.

The second step is to issue a Defense Management Report Decision to create a Joint Resource Management Corps Steering Committee to develop definitive plans for the implementation of the Joint Resource Management Corps (JRMC). This committee should be chaired by a general officer (preferably a major general) who will report directly to the Comptroller of the Army (COA). The COA would report all progress and issues directly to the

Department of Defense Comptroller. The committee should be fully staffed with senior military officers, senior non-commissioned officers, and senior civilian personnel from all Services who are very knowledgeable in the fields of comptrollership and finance and accounting. This committee should be empowered to establish milestones and to coordinate with all Services for the implementation of JRMC. Additionally, the committee would determine facility requirements, manpower, and other resource needs for the the JRMC.

The third step is to designate the U.S. Army as the executive agent to develop joint resource management training to include all aspects of finance and accounting and comptrollership. Additionally, it would develop joint tactical doctrine for comptrollership and finance units under the direction of the COA and oversight by the Joint Resource Management Corps Steering Committee. Envisioned here is the creation of one joint school (called the Joint Resource Management School) headed by a brigadier general and staffed by all the Services to train the entire gamut of courses relating to resource management. These courses include comptrollership, finance and accounting, planning, programming and budgeting, civilian pay, retired pay, and travel pay. The school would teach all military and civilians working in the resource management field. This joint school could tailor courses for unique requirements of a particular Service. Additionally, the brigadier general would have the responsibility of being deployed

during wartime as the Commander, Theater Resource Management Command, (previously called Theater Finance Command) to provide battlefield resource management policy for the CINC and to ensure unity of effort among the deployed JRMC units.

The fourth step pertains to the adoption of a single military pay system--Joint Services Software--by all the Services. This step is critical to the further creation of a JRMC. All Services must speak the same language of military pay. This unity of effort will enhance the total interoperability of pay support to all soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines during peace and war. Essentially, a joint military pay system will permit any joint finance unit to support any service member worldwide. The savings generated by common computer software alone will be tremendous.

The fifth step involves a "full steam ahead" approach to the ultimate consolidation of the automated military pay system (JSS) for all Services at one finance center under DFAS. Furthermore, the other resource management functions-- accounting, retired pay, transportation billings, travel, and civilian pay--should be consolidated perhaps among the six major finance centers in operation or elsewhere as soon as possible. The sooner we can consolidate, the sooner we can truly become joint and working in the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, DMRD 910, and Senator Nunn's call for action--a difficult task but an achievable one.

The sixth and final step involves the actual creation of the Joint Resource Management Corps. The JRMC will be the umbrella

organization responsible for the professional development of all military and civilian finance and resource management personnel no matter which Service they belong to. The JRMC is much more than a state of mind. It is a way of life! It is the creation of an innovative body of uniformed personnel and civilians who will serve our forces and help insure that the maximum value is received from every defense dollar. It establishes a joint structure that will facilitate change needed within DOD. The JRMC will develop service personnel and civilians to serve in tactical resource management units or at one of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service centers, respectively. The key point is that resource management training and joint doctrine development will be administered under the executive agency of the Army and be directly responsible to the DOD Comptroller. Savings generated by this joint undertaking are yet to be determined but are expected to be tremendous. The consolidation of the many existing comptroller and finance and accounting schools under one executive agent will alone reap substantial savings. Additional savings will be realized by developing joint resource management doctrine and by identifying common equipment needs for the tactical resource management units to include deployable automated systems, communications, transportation, and multiservice forms. Furthermore, common reporting procedures of resource management information to DFAS will facilitate the interpretation, use, and further dissemination of financial data to the Treasury, Congress, and others. The camaraderie created

by having a Joint Resource Management Corps will inculcate a pride in skillcraft never before realized in finance/resource management units. The interoperability of resource management units in support of commanders and service members will be unsurpassed anywhere in the world.

CONCLUSION

The large effort to create the Joint Resource Management Corps is a monumental challenge and will more than pay for itself. The difficulties of moving functions, consolidating the finance schools, and overcoming normal bureaucratic processes in promoting positive change will more than pay for themselves by the resulting superior pay service and comptroller support. The initial impetus of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, followed by the directives of DMRD 910, and the call to further action by Senator Nunn--to reduce redundancy, to consolidate/realign roles and missions, and to create economies and efficiencies--truly can be achieved in the financial management arena. The framework for achieving these goals is presented in the six steps above. It is recommended that the Department of Defense implement the plan to make these ideas a reality.

The Joint Resource Management Corps will promote unity of effort among the Services and create huge savings by developing joint training, doctrine, and equipment. Esprit de Corps will be fostered heretofore rarely known within the ranks of the military financial management organizations. Finally, the Joint Resource

Management Corps will provide a great service to our Nation through standardized accounting and reporting of taxpayers' resources and will provide greater support to the service members throughout the Armed Forces. Let us now reshape the force and create the Joint Resource Management Corps--the sharp point of the arrow that will serve our great Nation well into the 21st century.

Appendix

Finance Units Deployed and Mobilized

I. Active Units Deployed

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number of Soldiers Deployed</u>	<u>Deployment Dates</u>	
		<u>Adv Party</u>	<u>Main Body</u>
18th FG			
82d FSU	12	8 Aug 90	19 Jan 91
1107th FSU	41	8 Aug 90	8 Sep 90
101st FSU*	60	17 Aug 90	13 Sep 90
215th FSU	68	25 Aug 90	10 Sep 90
24th FSU*	74	29 Aug 90	29 Aug 90
230th FSU	27	9 Sep 90	6 Oct 90
15th FSU	30	9 Sep 90	19 Oct 90
502d FSU	30	9 Sep 90	19 Oct 90
HHC, 18th FG	33	20 Sep 90	20 Sep 90
33d FSU	15	8 Oct 90	8 Oct 90

*Both the 24th FSU and the 101st FSU commanders served as base camp commanders for the divisions they supported and were augmented by approximately 175 additional soldiers each. For example, during Desert Storm, the Commander, 101st FSU commanded Camp Eagle II, the home of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

7th FG			
HHC, 7th FG	41	5 Dec 90	9 Dec 90
14th FSU	3		
13th FSU	1		
105th FSU	1		
106th FSU	2		
Replacements	4		
106th FSC		3 Dec 90	5&6 Dec 90
106th FSU	58		
13th FSU	2		
14th FSU	13		
3d FSU	1		
HHC, 7th FG	1		
Ft Knox FAO	3		
501st FSU	1		
78th FSU	1		
1st FSC		4 Dec 90	
1st FSU			5 Dec 90
59th FSU			9 Jan 91
17th FSC		7 Dec 90	15 Dec 90
17th FSU	38		
3d FSU	19		
13th FSU	10		
78th FSU	10		
501st FSU	20		

105th FSU	1
7th Eng Bde	1

<u>Unit</u>	Number of Soldiers		Deployment Dates	
	<u>Deployed</u>	<u>Adv Party</u>	<u>Main Body</u>	
7th FG (cont.)				
201st FSC			18 Dec 90	20&27 Dec 90
201st FSU	13			
HHC, 7th FG	2			
22d FSU	3			
39th FSU	35			
503d FSU	20			
8th FSU	3			
117th FSU	4			
Replacements	2			

II. Reserve Units Mobilized

A. US Army Reserve Finance Units

<u>Unit/State</u>	Number of Soldiers <u>Mobilized</u>	Mobilization <u>Date</u>	FSU HQs <u>Location</u>
368th FSU/Kansas	81	21 Nov 90	Ft Riley
453rd FSU/Pennsylvania	75	21 Nov 90	Ft Stewart
412th FSU/Indiana	78	22 Jan 91	Ft Jackson
376th FSU/Wisconsin	86	25 Jan 91	Ft Sheridan
338th FSU/Puerto Rico	91	25 Jan 91	SWA
325th FSU/Ohio	97	15 Mar 91	Ft McPherson

B. Army National Guard

<u>Unit/State</u>	Number of Soldiers <u>Mobilized</u>	Mobilization <u>Date</u>	FSU HQs <u>Location</u>
210th FSU/Mississippi	39	29 Nov 90	Ft Rucker
49th FSU/Texas	71	22 Jan 91	Ft Sill
153d FSU/Florida	42	22 Jan 91	Ft McCoy
130th FSU/N. Carolina	56	25 Jan 91	Ft Bragg
28th FSU/Pennsylvania	102	15 Mar 91	Ft Meade
138th FSU/Indiana	86	15 Mar 91	Ft Harrison

C. US Army Reserve Garrisons (includes finance cell)

<u>Unit/State</u>	Number of Finance Soldiers <u>Mobilized</u>	Mobilization <u>Date</u>	Primary <u>Location</u>
3220th USAG/Florida	15	27 Aug 90	Ft Stewart
3397th USAG/Tennessee	15	27 Aug 90	Ft Campbell
4013th USAG/Louisiana	16	28 Nov 90	Ft Polk
5064th USAG/Michigan	17	27 Aug 90	Ft McCoy
USARF Puerto Rico	4		Ft Buchanan

Data from Defense Finance and Accounting Service, "Military Pay to the Army Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Aug 90-Jun 91," Appx.Q.

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